

Original Research

Legal Structure of Complex Employment Modes for Takeaway Platforms in the Context of Low Carbon Economy

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The issue of labor supply is not necessarily a matter of labor law. In the context of a low-carbon economy, flexible employment on platforms is more conducive to achieving labor demand matching and controlling labor costs in the online catering logistics industry. Compared to the Labor Law, the labor contract rules in civil law have irreplaceable advantages in interpreting and regulating “non-standard labor relations” and “non-traditional labor relations” under the new employment form. The judicial adjudication dilemma in the employment of takeaway platforms is mainly reflected in the imbalanced relation between the protection of labor rights and interests and the development of platform economy, the lack of clear legal norms, and unified trial logic in judicial judgment, and the lack of standardization and stability in the interpretation method of judgment. There are some problems in the typology research on the complex employment modes of takeaway platforms, such as different classification standards and the failure to reveal the essence of legal relations under the employment modes. The legal structure analysis of employment in takeaway platforms within the academic circles does not conform to the employment reality, and moreover, it is not accurate enough, which results in the unclear nature of legal relation between multi-party employment subjects and that between employment subjects and practitioners and the ambiguous employment responsibilities. From the perspective of civil contract type, the employment modes of takeaway platforms can be extracted into “commercial franchising mode of takeaway platforms”, “employment mode of takeaway platforms”, and “labor dispatching mode of takeaway platforms”. Aiming to break through the research path dependence of “standard labor relations”, the article refines the legal structure of the delivery platform’s business model and provides a theoretical basis for overcoming legislative technical deficiencies in the unclear format of independent labor transaction contracts.

Keywords: low-carbon economy, takeaway platform, employment mode, types of civil contracts, employment responsibility

relation between platform enterprises and takeaway riders, and the status of various distribution partners in complex employment is not clear and sufficient. For another example, Wang divided the employment mode of organizational platforms into three types: “A mode, in which platforms directly hire labor providers”, “B mode, in which agents hire labor providers”, and “C mode, in which labor providers register and take orders independently”. Similar divisions include “direct marketing mode”, “labor dispatching mode”, “agent mode”, and “crowdsourcing mode” [9]. These classifications overcome the shortcomings that the relation between distribution partners and takeaway platforms is insufficient, but moreover, the classification standards are inconsistent and the nature of the legal relation of their employment patterns cannot be revealed. For example, the “agent model” only generally describes the most basic forms of cooperation between takeaway platforms and agents, and between agents and riders, but ignores its characteristics different from general labor outsourcing. For another example, the “crowdsourcing mode” is divided according to the working mode and working characteristics of takeaway riders, while other modes are divided according to the relation between takeaway platforms and distribution partners. In reality, takeaway platforms have already developed more complicated situations such as “recruiting crowdsourced riders through flexible employment service providers”, which is difficult to generalize with the “crowdsourcing model”. In addition, some foreign scholars argue that the regulation of platform employment should not be limited to the routine of “contract characterization-applicable rules”, and the legal application method should be shifted to assigning responsibilities according to different situations [10]. The author thinks that it is necessary to sort out and summarize the types of employment patterns again, so as to lay the foundation for the subsequent analysis of the legal structure.

Legal Relations in the Complex Employment of Takeaway Platforms

The legal relation between the platform-related employment subjects and takeaway riders have been extracted and generalized in the academic circles to varying degrees through the complex employment mode of platforms. The main viewpoints include “labor relations”, “labor dispatching relations”, “contracts for work relations”, “labor outsourcing relations”, “crowdsourcing relation”, and “intermediary relations” [11]. Among them, the “intermediary relation theory” is an excuse for the operators of takeaway platforms to reduce their own responsibilities, and it is the alienation of legal relations [7]. The author thinks that the relation between platform enterprises and first-level distribution partners should not be summarized by “labor outsourcing relation”, and the relation between distribution partners at all levels should not be summarized using “transfer of contract” or “subcontracting”, because generally

speaking, the contracting unit of labor outsourcing does not participate in the command and management of labor providers, which is inconsistent with the fact that takeaway platform enterprises still partially participate in the command and management of riders after contracting and may easily confuse the relation between multi-party employment subjects on the platform. In addition, “crowdsourcing relation” itself is not a legal term. At best, it can only be used to summarize the business operation mode of takeaway platforms but not to define the specific legal relations.

In some studies, the legal relations of complex platform employment modes have been analyzed in a segmented way. For instance, it has been pointed out that the contract structure of organizational-type platform employment modes is the combination of “outsourcing contracts” between platforms and agents and “labor contracts” between agents and labor providers [12]. For another example, some scholars believe that the legal relations between platform enterprises and labor providers is either labor relation, incomplete labor relation, and civil relation [13], or a mixture of contract for work and labor contracts [9]. Some scholars have summarized the complex employment relation on platforms as “a triangular employment relation on platforms” [4]. The advantage of these studies is that they break through the previous position of studying “single contract” and recognize the reality that the legal relation between platform-related employers is not homogenous. However, the shortcomings are also obvious: First, the legal relation between many employment subjects in the platform employment chain has not been accurately positioned, making it impossible to find the corresponding legal rules. Second, although the research on the “triangular employment relation on platforms” summarizes the legal relation of pairwise combination as a whole, it remains at the explanation from the perspective of labor subordination, and no attention is paid to the analysis path outside the labor law. And the conclusions inevitably fall into the nest of “fake labor service and real employment” again.

Judgment Dilemma for Complex Employment Modes of Takeaway Platforms

Imbalanced Relation between the Protection of Labor Rights and Interests and the Development of Platform Economy

Since 2018, the Supreme People’s Court has repeatedly highlighted that labor dispute trials should implement the concept of “double protection”, that is, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of laborers and protecting the benign development of platform economy to promote mutual progress. However, the policy-oriented judgment thinking has led to the loss of objectivity in some trials, and the relation between the protection of labor rights and interests and the development of platform economy is out of balance.

Around 2021, the government’s attitude towards the employment of the new business platforms changed from “relatively tolerant” to “strengthening the labor regulation of platforms”. Especially after the Notice on the Joint Release of the Third Batch of Typical Cases of Labor and Personnel Disputes (No.36 [2023] of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) was issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the Supreme People’s Court, it has been highlighted by the Court that takeaway platform enterprises should take more responsibility for the labor protection of riders and strengthen the realizability of compensation for work-related injuries or third-party infringement of riders. At the same time, the Court begins to lay the emphasis on practicing the judgment concept of “penetrating supervision” and to determine the nature of employment according to the actual performance of the contract between the rider and the employer [14]. The above-mentioned policy-oriented judgment thinking has aroused concerns in the academic and practical circles. Some scholars have pointed out that the provision of “not completely conforming to the situation of establishing labor relations” in the Guiding Opinions may alienate the original intention of “double protection” into an embarrassing situation of “double-loss” for both laborers and platform enterprises[15]; some scholars also believe that the idea of hearing labor relation disputes with “penetrating supervision” is worthy of reflection; some judges have also pointed out that there is a problem of “generalized identification

of labor relations” in the trial of new employment cases. Generalized identification of labor relations will increase the cost of platform enterprises, which is not conducive to social development in the long run [16]. From the point of view of the author, these doubts are not unreasonable, and the implementation of the “double protection” concept needs comprehensive and meticulous legal norms. The reason why the complexity of the employment modes of takeaway platforms can achieve such a remarkable “legal isolation” effect is that it is not so much the complex employment subject of platforms that is “isolated” but rather the simple and single judgment criteria for labor relations. Therefore, it is difficult to find the balance point between the rights and interests of laborers and the development of platform economy only by the provisions of labor policy, and it is also difficult to coordinate the relations of rights and obligations between laborers and employers.

Lack of Clear Legal Norms and Unified Judicial Logic

Judging from the 70 Judicial judgments searched by the author from 2020 to 2023 in Table 1. and Table 2., the legal basis for the court to judge the employment dispute cases of takeaway platforms is mainly divided into two types. The first type is the rule of labor laws, such as the *Labor Law* and *Labor Contract Law*, which have not clearly defined the concept of labor relations or given definite identification standards. In practice, labor relations have been identified by courts still following

Table 1. Sample size of labor dispute cases on takeaway platforms in the 10 regions of Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Chongqing, Jilin, Xinjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Heilongjiang and Tibet.

Time	Region	Search keywords	Sample size for second instance judgment
2020-2023	Beijing	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	13
2020-2023	Guangdong	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	8
2020-2023	Jiangsu	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	6
2020-2023	Chongqing	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	3
2020-2023	Jilin	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	2
2020-2023	Xinjiang	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	2
2020-2023	Liaoning	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	1
2020-2023	Shandong	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	1
2020-2023	Heilongjiang	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	1
2020-2023	Tibet	(Labor disputes OR Labor relations disputes) AND (Lazas OR Eleme Sankuai OR Meituan)	1
		Total	38

assigning tasks, assessing and appraising, implementing rewards and punishments, and paying distribution salary according to the data results[22-23]. In this way, the online supervision of the algorithm is the main part, supplemented by the offline bureaucratic monitoring of distribution stations, and takeaway platforms realize the dual labor management of escort riders through the commercial franchising mode [24]. This also constitutes the fundamental difference between the employment mode of takeaway platforms and the traditional labor outsourcing. In the above cooperation mode, the legal relation between takeaway platforms and distribution agents conforms to the definition and requirements of commercial franchising [25-26] and is a typical commercial franchising relation. According to whether distribution agents continue to outsource the distribution business, the above-mentioned commercial franchising mode can be subdivided into the following two modes.

(1) Simple business franchising mode of takeaway platforms

The basic structure of this model is that takeaway platforms are commercially franchised and special riders are directly recruited by distribution agents (see Table 3.). Since special riders are more closely related to distribution agents under this mode, their relation will be usually examined first by courts in practice, and the relation conforming to the legal features of labor relations is identified as labor relation [27] and that not conforming to the legal features of labor relations is identified as non-labor relation. Meanwhile, the relation between takeaway platforms and distribution agents will be rarely directly identified by courts. According to individual courts, the two present a “cooperative relation” or a “legal partnership” or the content of the cooperation agreement between the two is just generally described.

In many cases, takeaway platforms claimed that the agreement was a commercial franchising contract to show that the distribution agent could bear the responsibility independently, but few courts responded positively to this. What is the legal relation between takeaway platforms and riders under this mode, and do takeaway platforms need to take responsibility for riders recruited by the distribution agent? Although the current court decisions vary widely, the *Regulations on Commercial Franchise* does not stipulate franchisors’ external tort liability, and the academic theory about the

employment risk of takeaway platforms as franchisers is still in the discussion stage [7, 27]. But at least it should be realized that the franchisers’ substitution responsibility in commercial franchising may be another explanation path to investigate the employers’ responsibility of takeaway platforms besides the thinking of labor laws.

(2) Complex commercial franchising mode of takeaway platforms

Difficulties in recruitment, high mobility, and changeable demand for employment in business peaks and valleys are common pain points in the employment field of takeaway platforms. Therefore, the complexity of this mode is reflected in the fact that after being authorized by platforms, distribution agents once again outsource the personnel management transactional work such as rider recruitment, salary distribution, social security, and provident fund payment, and hand it over to human resources service agencies for management. Its overall structure is as follows: commercial franchise of takeaway platforms, human resources outsourcing of distribution agents, and flexible employment services provided by human resources service institutions (see Table 4.).

In practice, the agreements signed between distribution agents of takeaway platforms and human resources service institutions include the platform service agreement of flexible employment, the outsourcing contract, and the labor contract. When reviewing such employment modes, courts do not concern the agreement in the form of agreements, but they more tend to investigate the legal relations between riders and distribution agents according to the labor management fact and subordinate characteristics. Similarly, the phenomenon of “same case with different judgments” is more prominent because the standards for determining labor relations are too broad. After the policy shifted to strengthen the standardization of platform labor and employment in 2021, this kind of employment mode is more likely to be regarded as “the fact that distribution agents implement labor employment in the name of outsourcing” [28].

As far as the author is concerned, the above flexible employment mode of distribution agents is a typical kind of human resource outsourcing. In China, human resource outsourcing belongs to a subdivision type of “human resource service” in the national economic

Table 3. Legal structure table I of commercial franchising mode of takeaway platforms: simple commercial franchising mode.

Employment mode	Civil contract type	Legal structure		
		Legal relation		Legal responsibility
		Platform and distribution agent	Distribution agent and special rider	
Commercial franchise	Commercial franchising contract	Commercial franchising contract relation	Labor relation or service relation	Distribution agents undertake employment responsibilities and platforms assume the vicarious responsibilities of franchisers

industry classification and also a professional service form recognized by the state to support flexible employment. It means that employers subcontract some positions to outsourcing units (mostly human resources service institutions), which recruit personnel according to business processes and job responsibilities, and these employees provide services to employers. Outsourcing units are responsible for personnel management of the outsourced employees and employers take charge of business management. From the perspective of legal relations and according to the relevant regulations of the Ministry of Finance, human resource outsourcing service, as the object of tax payment, belongs to “broker-agent service”. It can be seen that the flexible employment service provided by human resources service institutions belongs to agency behavior, and the consequences of agency behavior are attributable to the contract-issuing unit. Meanwhile, the employee relation of human resource outsourcing is in the employer [29], so its employment risk and responsibility should also vest in the employer. Specific to the employment modes of takeaway platforms discussed in this research, the distribution agent, which serves as both the agent and the employer, should bear the employment risks and responsibilities of riders.

The problem left here is that this mode is a combined employment mode of commercial franchising and human resource outsourcing. Once the responsibility arises, how can the responsibility be distributed between the franchiser’s takeaway platform and the franchisee’s distribution agent? In this regard, the judgments of individual courts on traffic accident liability disputes in the express distribution industry are quite enlightening. The judgment first confirmed that the franchising relation between the two parties was commercial franchise according to the Franchise (Franchise) Contract signed between the franchising company and the franchised company, and the franchisee was mainly liable for compensation. At the same time, the principle of “degree of control and degree of fault” was taken as the judgment standard for the franchiser to bear the responsibility of the employees from the franchisee’s contractor for causing harm to the third party, and

the franchisor was judged to bear the supplementary compensation responsibility.

It is worth noting that there are many misunderstandings about the relation among takeaway platforms, distribution agents, and human resources service institutions, which, for example, collectively refers to “contracting” relation [4]. Others think that the relation between distribution agents and human resources service institutions is “transfer of contract” or “subcontracting” [30]. There are also individual courts that identify the relation between the three as “joint venture relation”. The theory of “joint venture relation” is exactly the same as the theory of “multi-party employment labor relation” [31-32] advocated by academic circles in recent years. In this regard, the author holds an objection. This is because, first, the fundamental feature of a partnership joint venture is that all parties in the joint venture jointly invest, operate, and share profits and share risks. In this case, Zhuhai Mesoda Company and Anhui Bodu Company have not jointly invested in Beijing Sankuai Company (“Meituan Platform”), a “joint venture” recognized by the court, let alone jointly operated and shared the profits. Secondly, there are essential differences between takeaway platforms and distribution agents and between distribution agents and human resources service institutions. First, commercial franchising requires the franchisee to maintain a high degree of consistency with the franchiser in personnel management and business management, while human resource outsourcing allows the contracting unit to hand over some personnel management functions to a third party, while retaining the management right of the core business. Second, commercial franchising usually does not allow the franchisee to “be authorized twice”. For example, in the “General Rules for Urban Cooperation” of Meituan Platform, the types and scenarios of outsourcing such as unauthorized anchor (borrowing qualification) and transfer by distribution agents are business violations. However, human resource outsourcing allows the contracting unit to continue to decompose the personnel management functions and subcontract them to different human resource management institutions. It can be

Table 4. Legal structure II of commercial franchising mode for takeaway platforms: complex commercial franchising mode.

Employment mode	Civil contract type	Legal structure				Legal responsibility
		Legal relation				
		Platform-distribution agent relation	Distribution agent-human resource service institution relation	Distribution agent-special rider relation		
Commercial franchising	Commercial franchising contract and human resource outsourcing contract	Commercial franchising contract relation	Human resource outsourcing relation	Labor relation	Distribution agents undertake employment responsibilities and platforms assume supplementary vicarious liabilities	

itself due to its work, the ordering party shall not be held liable [37]. The delivery service of crowdsourced riders is always under the technical control of takeaway platforms, which is obviously inconsistent with contracts for work relations. Moreover, if the legal relation is determined according to contracts for work, crowdsourced riders will bear the losses independently, which obviously hinders the realization of the policy goal of protecting riders. Taking “the third-type labor employment relation” as an example, the theory argues that the platform crowdsourcing model is characterized by “no personality subordination but with economic subordination” [38]. The author believes that this understanding is biased. This is because, if the criteria for determining the subordination of labor relations are taken for contrast [39], the three elements that reflect the subordination of crowdsourced riders’ personality, namely the command, supervision, and punishment of takeaway platforms, have not completely disappeared, especially the command and supervision of takeaway platforms for riders by using algorithm technology is not weaker than that of the platform for special riders. Similarly, the “theory of type fusion contract” holds that the “autonomy of labor providers” in this mode marks the weakening of the platforms’ control over the rider’s labor and the decline of the rider’s personality subordination [9]. However, the author thinks that the “autonomy” of crowdsourced riders is more manifested. Crowdsourced riders are not subject to the bureaucratic management of offline distribution stations, and enjoy the freedom to take orders and the freedom to choose distribution tools and working time and place, but it does not mean the freedom of labor after the riders take orders, and their distribution process is always monitored by takeaway platforms. Crowdsourced riders will face fines or credit downgrade if they violate the platform regulations. What’s more, the autonomy of crowdsourced riders may also be constrained by a series of “scoring” and “level” rules set by platforms. Specially, what most crowdsourced riders can choose are the delivery orders left by special riders from remote locations and relatively low unit prices. In order to effectively send orders, the Meituan takeaway platform has set a number of “crowdsourcing levels” according to the effective completion rate and on-time delivery rate of orders. Only when riders reach a certain level can they enjoy the privilege of high-quality orders that are close to each other and cancel orders for free. At the same time, the Meituan platform will also reduce the level of riders who refuse to receive orders continuously.

The crowdsourced riders refusing to receive orders on Ele.me platform will be restricted by the platform in order-receiving. If the restriction continues, the riders will be subject to permanent account ban by the platform. To sum up, although the intensity of economic subordination and organizational subordination of crowdsourced riders the platforms under the “platform-crowdsourcing” model cannot meet the standard of standard labor relations, the model generally presents the characteristics of “strong platform control” and “low rider dependence”, which meets the conditions for establishing civil employment relations.

Labor Dispatching Mode of Takeaway Platforms

In this mode, crowdsourced riders register on takeaway platforms and sign the Network Contract Agreement with human resources service companies online through takeaway platforms. The takeaway platforms and the human resources service companies sign Platform Service Agreement, Outsourcing Service Agreement, and Service Cooperation Contract. Superficially, the employment mode is quite similar to the “distribution agent-human resources service organization-special rider” structure under the commercial franchising mode. In fact, the legal structure of this employment mode is different from that of human resources outsourcing, which is more in line with the legal representation of labor dispatch (see Table 6.).

First of all, these human resources service agencies usually have the qualification of labor dispatch, and most courts have determined that human resources service companies and riders in this mode present labor relations after substantive examination. Secondly, for platforms, the distribution service provided by crowdsourced riders belongs to a kind of transportation capacity supplement and an auxiliary job position. Thirdly, these human resources service agencies are only responsible for recruiting crowdsourced riders, providing riders with clothing and business training, paying salaries, and paying social insurance premium, etc., and do not actually participate in employment management, while platforms directly direct and manage the distribution process of crowdsourced riders by using algorithm technology, rules, and regulations. In this labor dispatching mode, human resources service companies are the labor dispatch units and takeaway platforms are the employers, accompanied by the labor dispatch contract relation between the human resources service

Table 5. Legal structure of employment modes for takeaway platforms.

Employment mode	Civil contract type	Legal structure	
		Legal relation	Legal responsibility
Recruitment mode	Employment contract	Platforms and crowdsourced riders	Platforms undertake employer’s liability
		Employment relation	

and responsibilities really surface. This may also be an effective way to solve the current dilemma regarding the applicability of laws to the complex employment of platforms and respond to the urgent needs of platform enterprises in the digital economy era to optimize the legal environment for business operation.

The focus of this article is on the legal issues of employment on takeaway platforms. Our findings on the legal structure of complex employment patterns in takeaway platforms can be extended to the study of employment relationships in labor organization based online trading platforms, such as e-commerce express delivery platforms, ride hailing platforms, ride hailing platforms, and live streaming platforms. Specifically:

(1) The research and judgment of employment relations on labor organization platforms cannot be limited to the scope of labor law. The gap between labor law and civil law in the legal adjustment of labor exchange relations should be filled by supplementing and applying civil law norms. The employment relationship generally refers to the total legal relationship of using the labor force of others through contracts. However, in China, having the status of a worker under labor law is a core condition for enjoying social insurance protection. Therefore, mainstream research on the issue of platform labor providers tends to determine whether platform labor providers are workers, and advocates recognizing platform labor providers as workers, or at least categorizing them as “quasi employees”, and then including them as much as possible in the scope of labor protection to solve their labor rights protection issues. In the long-standing research on labor protection, the issue of “labor providers” on platforms has gradually become confused with the issue of “workers in labor relations”. This directly leads to a narrow legal application path for employment relationships and employment responsibilities on labor organization platforms, and even triggers deviations in judicial decision-making logic. Therefore, it is necessary to break through the limitations of the perspective of labor law, open up the application channels between labor law and civil law, take employment relations rather than labor relations as the starting point, and comprehensively consider the employment norms of labor organization platforms and the protection of labor force providers in the institutional system of market allocation of labor resources.

(2) The study and judgment of employment relationships and responsibilities on labor organization platforms should not be based on the convenience of current legislation, but should be based on the actual employment situation of the platform. In China, the Labor Law and Civil Code Tort Liability Law are the main legal basis for regulating the employment of labor organization platforms, but their legal loopholes are significant. At the same time, there is a lack of typical contract rules for labor contracts and service contracts, which cannot meet the current employment disputes on the platform. Due to legislative loopholes, the subjective assumption of “platform de labor” prevalent

in academic research and the judicial path of “labor relationship generalization” in court practice obscure the actual legal relationships in the employment of takeaway platforms. In fact, the status and role of labor contract rules, including labor contracts, employment contracts, contracting contracts, commission contracts, and labor dispatch contracts, as well as typical service contract regulations represented by commercial franchise contracts, in applying employment issues on such platforms are not necessarily inferior to those of labor laws. Therefore, in terms of legal regulation of employment on labor organization platforms, it is necessary to fully recognize that civil law is a prerequisite for the special protection system of labor law, and pay attention to the basic function of giving full play to the general contract transaction rules and distinguishing contract types of civil law.

Finally, it is important to discuss the scalability and limitations of this study. There are at least a few unresolved issues in this study.

(1) Although this article basically follows the quantitative research methods in statistics in the research paradigm, if more samples are used, it may reveal more profoundly the types of complex employment patterns and legal structures of takeaway platforms.

(2) Due to limitations in the topic and length of the paper, there are two viewpoints that have not been discussed in this article:

Firstly, the element of “control” is not an exclusive tool for identifying labor relations based on attribute standards. It can also be explored from the perspective of the “control factor” element that replaces responsibility by employers, exploring the potential of elements that reflect “control” such as “platform algorithms” and “rider appearance” in the complex employment responsibility identification of takeaway platforms.

Secondly, under the premise that commercial franchising, labor and similar labor service contracts cannot be formally included in typical contracts of the Civil Code in the short term, the explanatory advantage of civil law in flexible employment issues of new forms can be reshaped by exploring alternative liability mechanisms for franchisors, labor service and similar labor service recipients in commercial franchising.

The limitations of this study are also the space for future research, and the academic community can continue to conduct research on the aforementioned unresolved issues.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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