ORIGINAL RESEARCH
The Behavioral Economics of Water Pollution
Supervision: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
with Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting
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1
School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, 100070, Beijing, China
2
Armed Police Command Academy, 300250, Tianjin, China
3
Management College, Beijing Union University, 100101, Beijing, China
Submission date: 2024-07-30
Final revision date: 2024-10-10
Acceptance date: 2024-11-14
Online publication date: 2025-01-31
Publication date: 2026-01-29
Corresponding author
Xinyu Wang
School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, 100070, Beijing, China
Pol. J. Environ. Stud. 2026;35(1):293-303
KEYWORDS
TOPICS
ABSTRACT
In contemporary society, water pollution has emerged as a critical environmental challenge,
necessitating effective strategies for its control. This paper examines the strategic interactions involved
in water pollution control, focusing particularly on the behavioral choices and influencing factors
of governmental bodies and industrial stakeholders. By integrating psychological accounting theory
into an evolutionary game model, we comprehensively analyze the decision-making processes of
both government entities and industrial polluters. We simulate the trade-offs and choices between
active pollution control measures and laissez-faire approaches. Our findings reveal that psychological
value perceptions play a crucial role in shaping all stakeholders’ behavioral decisions and strategy
evolution. The effectiveness of water pollution control is influenced by a range of factors, including
treatment costs, decision-making influence coefficients, and risk preferences. The study underscores
the importance of acknowledging the impact of psychological value perceptions, reducing treatment
costs, and enhancing environmental awareness among participants as an effective means to promote
water pollution control behaviors. Based on our game-theoretic analysis and simulation results, we
propose specific policy recommendations and theoretical insights aimed at enhancing the efficiency
of water pollution control efforts, with the ultimate goal of promoting the protection and sustainable
utilization of water resources and raising public awareness of environmental protection.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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