ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Mechanisms for the Evolution of a Multiple
Governance Model: Evidence from Water
Pollution Control in the Erhai Lake
Tourism Environment in China
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School of Economics, Guangxi University, Nanning City, Guangxi Province, China
Submission date: 2024-01-16
Final revision date: 2024-02-28
Acceptance date: 2024-03-29
Online publication date: 2024-08-05
Corresponding author
Bao Feng
School of Economics, Guangxi University, No. 100, Daxuedong Road, Xixiangtang District, 530004, Nanning City, China
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ABSTRACT
Starting from the perspective of multiple governance, we put the central government,
the local governments, and tourism enterprises in the same analytical framework, regard local residents
as the external supervisory force of the water pollution management process, construct a tripartite game
model of water pollution management in the tourism environment of Erhai Lake in China by using
the evolutionary game method, solve the model and discuss the equilibrium of the game, and further
simulate and analyze the impacts of the relevant parameters on the game system by using MATLAB.
It is found that: (1) the stronger the allocation of special funds for environmental protection, the more
it can promote the positive governance of the local governments. However, at the same time, when
the local governments are negatively governed, the value of the administrative penalty imposed by
the central government on the local governments is too small to form a deterrent effect, and the
pressure of the administrative penalty is too high to weaken the confidence of the local government, so
the central government needs to be moderate in the administrative penalty imposed on the local officials.
(2) The higher the proportion of local government environmental protection special funds allocated to
tourism enterprises, the more they can promote the reduction of emissions by tourism enterprises, and
their incentive to reduce emissions will be strengthened when the main business income of tourism
enterprises increases due to the improvement of the tourism environment. (3) Local residents can
influence the environmental behavior of the central government, the local governments, and tourism
enterprises through the reputational feedback mechanism, which can promote the treatment of water
pollution in the tourism environment. (4) The collection of environmental tax by the local government
can motivate tourism enterprises to reduce emissions, but the environmental tax rate should be set at
[0,3.5], and if it is too high, tourism enterprises will lose confidence in reducing emissions.