Achieving “carbon neutrality” through the reduction of carbon emissions from urban industrial land represents a significant endeavor. The government, which acts as the policy maker, and enterprises, which function as executors, are the principal stakeholders in low-carbon land utilization. Disparities between these entities may result in game-theoretic dynamics stemming from differences in resource allocation and objectives. Drawing from the empirical context of low-carbon industrial land utilization in China, this study examines the decision-making behaviors of bounded rational actors, formulates a payoff matrix for the government-enterprise game, and scrutinizes the strategic behaviors of both entities concerning low-carbon land utilization. The findings indicate that (1) while government subsidies incentivize enterprises to engage in low-carbon land use, these subsidies should be judiciously controlled; (2) the government can expedite enterprise low-carbon transformations by stipulating carbon emission reduction targets for industrial land and implementing rational penalty standards; (3) reduced production costs and appropriate government subsidies can bolster enterprises’ inclination to adopt lowcarbon development strategies; and (4) the facilitation of carbon derivative transactions and the provision of carbon finance can encourage enterprises to embrace low-carbon land use tactics. Additionally, the study offers policy recommendations for promoting low-carbon land utilization, including urban industrial land regulation, the adoption of low-carbon technologies, and the establishment of low-carbon industrial parks and carbon trading markets.