Increasing farmers’ willingness to adopt green technologies is an important precondition for driving agricultural modes of production to adjust and achieve green development in agriculture. However, their willingness to adopt green technologies is influenced by their own government and consumer behavior. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model among farmers, government, and consumers and analyzes the optimal stability strategy. The influence of the change in adoption intention from weak to strong on the choice of optima government behavior is investigated by numerical simulation. The results show that there is an evolutionarily stable strategy combination (farmer adoption, government intervention, consumer purchase) under the premise of controlling the government subsidy. The effect of consumers’ willingness to consume on farmers’ green adoption is greater than that of the government’s intervention. The larger the proportion for farmers’ green income distribution, the higher the enthusiasm for farmers’ green production. Government subsidies are more suitable for low-willing farmers. When the willingness of farmers increases, the role of government fines becomes greater than subsidies. Therefore, the government should strengthen the quality supervision and publicity of green products, set up a service platform to smooth the channels of production and marketing, and at the same time make appropriate use of subsidies, fines, and other policies.